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THE "TOTAL PRODUCT" APPROACH TO
ANALYSIS OF ALLEGED TYING ARRANGEMENTS
MICHAEL DORE*
Introduction
A tying arrangement has been defined by the Supreme Court as
an agreement by a party to sell one product only on the condition that
the buyer also purchase a different product.' Such agreements have
been held to be per se violations of both the Sherman and Clayton
Acts.
2
Of course, before liability for a tying arrangement can be imposed,
courts3 must first determine that two separate products are in fact
involved in the transaction.' Numerous standards have been sug-
gested5 and used" in making this determination. None of these stan-
dards, however, has proved an adequate criterion for both regulating
business conduct and resolving the unique factual disputes with
which the courts are frequently presented in "tie-in" cases.
The purpose of this paper will be to offer suggestions for refocusing
the two-product determination in a manner that will put primary
* Associate, Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon, New York, New York;
B.A. Amherst College (1972); J.D. Rutgers Law School (1975).
1 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (an agreement by a party that he will sell a product
only on the condition that the buyer, if he chooses to buy another product, will pur-
chase this second product only from the same seller, is also considered a tying
agreement). See Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa.
1975), rev'd, 531 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1976), for an exhaustive discussion of the intricacies
of tying arrangements.
2 Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (Clayton
Act); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (Sherman
Act). See text accompanying notes 12-15 infra.
2 There is some dispute in the cases over whether this issue of product separability
is properly one for the court or for the jury. Compare Coniglio v. Highwood Serv., Inc.,
495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974) (question for jury) and
Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 353 F. Supp. 1072, 1076 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd,
487 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1973) (question for jury) with Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (question for court). This issue can reasonably be
viewed as a mixed question of law and fact, but one which should, in the absence of
overwhelming evidence, be left for the jury to determine.
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
See, e.g., Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust
Laws, 72 HAtv. L. REv. 50, 67-72 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Turner]; The Supreme
Court, 1968 Term, 83 HAav. L. Rv. 7, 235, 244 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Supreme
Court].
' See cases cited notes 18, 24, 25, and 28 infra.
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emphasis upon the options and the viewpoint of the individual con-
sumer rather than upon the motives of the seller or the relevant
market for the component products involved in the sale.
Analysis of Tying Arrangements
Tying arrangements were a very common business practice at the
time that the Sherman Act was enacted.7 Unlike other common busi-
ness arrangements,8 however, tie-ins have met with a good deal of
suspicion and opposition by the Court. In Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States,9 the Supreme Court said:
Tying arrangements, we may readily agree, flout the Sher-
man Act's policy that competition rule the marts of
trade. . . By conditioning his sale of one commodity on the
purchase of another, a seller coerces the abdication of buyers'
independent judgment as to the "tied" product's merits and
insulates it from the competitive stresses of the open market.
But any intrinsic superiority of the "tied" product would con-
vince freely choosing buyers to select it over others, anyway. 0
This belief that tying arrangements have a strong tendency to
distort competitive conditions in the market place" has led the Court
to hold that these arrangements constitute per se violations of the
antitrust laws "whenever a party has sufficient economic power with
respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition
See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
See, for example, Justice Frankfurter's comments concerning requirements con-
tracts:
Requirements contracts ... may well be of economic advantage
to buyers as well as to sellers, and thus indirectly of advantage to the
consuming public. In the case of the buyer, they may assure supply,
afford protection against rises in price, enable long term planning on
the basis of known costs, and obviate the expense and risk of storage
in the quantity necessary for a commodity having a fluctuating de-
mand. From the seller's point of view, requirements contracts may
make possible the substantial reduction of selling expenses, give pro-
tection against price fluctuations and-of particular advantage to a
newcomer to the field to whom it is important to know what capital
expenditures are justified-offer the possibility of a predictable
market.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-07 (1949) (citations omitted).
345 U.S. 594 (1953).
Id. at 605.
" But cf. Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 510
(1969) (White, J., dissenting).
"TOTAL PRODUCT" APPROACH.
in the market for the tied product and a 'not insubstantial' amount
of interstate commerce is affected.'
12
This statement of the test for determining a per se violation would
apparently exclude many common business relationships based on a
lack of sufficient economic power. The Court has held, however, that
sufficient economic power does not "require that the defendant have
a monopoly or even a dominant position throughout the market for a
tying product.' 3 Rather, the Court has held that the appropriate
question with respect to the issue of economic power is "whether the
seller has the power within the market for the tying product, to raise
prices or to require purchasers to accept burdensome terms that could
not be exacted in a completely competitive market. In short, the
question is whether the seller has some advantage not shared by his
competitors in the market for the tying product."' 4
The plaintiff of course must also show that a sufficient amount of
interstate commerce is involved before per se liability will be found.
This requirement, however, does not provide a major stumbling block
to antitrust plaintiffs. The Court has held that, in examining the
sufficiency of the interstate commerce involved, it will look not to the
dollar volume of commerce involved in the particular transaction
before it, but rather to the volume of all similar transactions allegedly
entered into by the defendant. 5
Whenever these minimal tests of the requisite economic power
and volume of interstate commerce are met, tie-in arrangements are
forbidden under the antitrust laws.' 5 These arrangements have been
'2 Id. at 499, citing International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947);
see also Northern Pac. Ry Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
'" United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., Slip Op. at 9, 45 U.S.L.
W. 4171 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 75-853).
Id. at 9-10.
's 394 U.S. at 502. It should also be noted that the Court appeared to find $200,000
to be a "not insubstantial" sum, whether that figure represented the amount involved
in the plaintiff's transaction or the defendant's total volume of sales.
I'- There is presently a dispute in the federal courts on the question of whether
"individual coercion" is also a separate and distinct element of a tie-in violation. In
order to establish this element of individual coercion, a plaintiff is required to demon-
strate that the unique facts under which he dealt with a particular seller were such
that the plaintiff was forced to submit to the seller's offer of sale of the two distinct
products only in conjunction with one another.
This disagreement with respect to the question of whether or not "coercion" is a
separate element of a tie-in claim has been quite substantial. Tying arrangements may
be either formalized in express written contracts or they may be the product of infor-
mal relationships between the party tying the two products and the party purchasing
those products. Courts have differed in their analysis of whether individual coercion
1977] i411
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so pervasive in business practice, however, that some courts have
reverted to the first criterion, the presence of two distinct products,
to avoid the automatic imposition of liability in contexts where the
unreasonableness of the arrangement is not readily apparent.,'
is an element of a tie-in claim depending upon whether or not the claim is based upon
an express contractual provision.
The case of Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1974),
found that even in the face of an express contractual provision which obligated a buyer
to purchase two distinct products, individual coercion would have to be demonstrated
before a violation of the antitrust laws could be found.
In addition, numerous courts have held that, in the absence of express contractual
provisions, the plaintiff must demonstrate individual coercion before he is permitted
to recover under the Sherman Act. Ungar v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., 68
F.R.D. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1975); American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-
Paramount Theaters, Inc., 446 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1971); Abercrombie v. Lum's, Inc.,
345 F. Supp. 387, 391 (S.D. Fla. 1972) ("In order to establish an illegal tying arrange-
ment arising from business conduct, franchisees must prove that they were coerced,
not merely persuaded, into purchasing the products at issue here.")
Other cases, however, have affirmatively held that where express contractual pro-
visions require the purchase of more than a single product, coercion may be inferred
from the express contractual provisions themselves. In re 7-Eleven Franchise Anti-
trust Litigation, 1972 Trade Cas. 1 74,156 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Milionas v. Amerada-Hess
Corp., 1976-2 Trade Cas. 61,069 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Finally, some cases have indicated that individual coercion is not in fact a sepa-
rate element of a tie-in claim even in the absence of an express contractual provision.
In Hill v. A.T.O., Inc., 535 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1976), the court found that "un unremit-
ting policy of tie-in, if accompanied by sufficient market power in the tying product
to appreciably restrain competition in the market for the tied product constitutes
direct coercion." 535 F.2d at 1355. Similarly, in Aamco Automatic Transmissions, Inc.
v. Tayloe, 67 F.R.D. 440 (E.D. Pa. 1975), the court held that "coercion, as such, is not
a prerequisite to liability. Rather, to the extent that there is an element of coercion in
a tie-in situation, it is found in two other necessary aspects of a tie. The first is the
sale on condition that the franchisee purchase other items. The second is the economic
power of the seller which enables him to impose the tie."
It has been noted that this entire dispute as to whether coercion is an element of
a tie-in violation is in fact a dispute over a "term of art." Aamco Automatic Transmis-
sions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 67 F.R.D. 440 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Developments in the Law-Class
Actions, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1318, 1509 n. 278 (1976) ("The term 'coercion' may perhaps
be best understood here not as a description of the subjective experience of the bargain-
ing process but as a measure of a court's confidence that the evidence before it does
indeed establish that a defendant connected the sale of two products-in purchasing
the tied product the plaintiff acted so automatically, it was if [sic] he were coerced.").
" No court has actually stated that it has engaged in a product separability
analysis only because it was impossible under the court's existing criteria to examine
the economic reasonableness of the business conduct involved. It is difficult to escape
the fact that this is actually what is being done in these cases, however. See cases cited
note 24 infra, and Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1251,
1270-71 (E.D. Mich. 1969), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 886 (1971) ("... there is now found,
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Evaluation of Two-Products Requirements
Inherent in the concept of a tying arrangement is the requirement
that one entity be "tied" to a separate and distinct entity. This basic
requirement of the presence of multiple products as a predicate for
tie-in liability was recognized by the Supreme Court in Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States.7 While that case recog-
nized the requirement of a finding of the presence of two products, it
did little to guide lower courts in determining how this finding was
to be made.
The first case which squarely dealt with this issue was United
States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.'" In Jerrold, Judge Van Dusen
noted that "as a general rule a manufacturer cannot be forced to deal
in the minimum product that could be sold or is usually sold. On the
other hand, it is equally clear that one cannot circumvent the anti-
trust laws simply by claiming that he is selling a single product. The
facts must be examined to ascertain whether or not there are legiti-
mate reasons for selling normally separate items in a combined form
to dispel any inferences that it is really a disguised tie-in."'" Thus,
the Jerrold case established two criteria"0 for determining the pres-
ence of two distinct products; the first was a finding that the items
were "normally separate," and the second was the absence of "legi-
timate reasons" for combining these items."
Each of these criteria has been reaffirmed in subsequent judicial
in amelioration of the adamant application [of] the per se rule to tying contracts in
antitrust laws the doctrine of business justification ... ").
17 345 U.S. 594, 613 (1953). See also United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter-
prises, Inc., Slip op. at 13, 45 U.S.L.W. 4171 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977) (No. 75-853) (Burger,
C.J., concurring).
" 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
" 187 F. Supp. at 559. This court was the first to recognize that a finding of an
illegal tie-in could in fact result in a judicially coerced sale of a component of a larger
product. Some subsequent decisions have apparently not been as cognizant of this
danger. See Fry v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D. Tex.
1973), modified, 1976-1 Trade Cases 60,728 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
2 It is interesting to note that the court apparently imposed the burden of demon-
strating whether or not two products were involved upon the defendants rather than
the plaintiff. 187 F. Supp. at 560. The reason for this is not clear, but it is indicative
of the suspicion with which the court viewed the two-product argument.
21 The Jerrold case itself involved a television antenna manufacturer's require-
ment that purchasers of his antennas also acquire a service contract covering the
system. The court held that the legitimate reason for the original combination of the
antenna and its servicing system precluded the finding of a tie-in sale, but the contin-
uation of this requirement after the original reasons for its institution were no longer
present did amount to a tie-in violation.
1977]
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decisions.2 The first requirement (that the items be normally sepa-
rate) has been criticized for not being sufficiently responsive to
changes and innovations in the market for the products involved in
the tying arrangements. 3 It has, however, continued to be utilized in
cases where the relevant market for the tie-in products was beyond
dispute.
2 4
The second criterion, legitimate business reasons, has remained
the basic test for determining the presence of two products.2 5 In
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.2 the Court
recognized that every tie-in case involved at the outset "the problem
of determining whether two separate products are in fact involved."
In determining whether two products could be found in Fortner,
the Court pointed to a number of specific factors which indicated that
two distinct products were involved. 2 In addition to this specific
examination of the "two product" factors, however, the Court also
reaffirmed the basic Jerrold rationale that legitimate business pur-
poses may obviate the finding of two distinct products. 29
2 See cases cited notes 24 and 25 infra.
23 Turner, supra note 5, at 68.
21 See Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258,
346-47 (N.D. Okla. 1973) rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975); Forrest
v. Capital Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 385 F. Supp. 831 (M.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 504 F.2d 891
(5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia
Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
Perhaps the best expression of the meaning of the term "legitimate reasons" is
contained in Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961).
- 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
Id. at 507.
13 In the Fortner case, a credit subsidiary of United States Steel extended loans
to the defendant on highly favorable terms. As a condition of receiving this credit,
however, the plaintiff was compelled to purchase certain products from United States
Steel. The Court pointed to the presence of two separate corporate entities and the
extension of more credit than that needed to purchase the tying product in support of
its contention that the transaction involved two products. 394 U.S. at 507. See the
discussion of these and other factors in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. &
Power Co., 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
9 394 U.S. at 506. ("It may turn out that the arrangement involved here serves
legitimate business purposes . . ."). It is interesting to note that Justice Fortas in
dissent makes the following statement:
At another point the majority even suggests that if U.S. Steel can
show "legitimate business purposes" and the absence of "competitive
advantage" (ante, at 506) in the credit market, it will have made out
a defense. But in an earlier part of the opinion, the majority says
explicitly that "it is clear that petitioner raised questions of fact
which, if proved at trial, would bring this tying arrangement within
"TOTAL PRODUCT" APPROACH
The Court did not go into an extensive analysis of what type of
legitimate business purposes would give rise to a finding of the ab-
sence of two products. The district court case which first proposed
this "two product" test, however, defined these business purposes in
terms of the injury which would be suffered by a party who was
prevented from requiring that his customers purchase the total prod-
uct in which he was willing to deal.39 Naturally, any "injury" suffered
by virtue of losing the illegitimate profits derived from the tie-in were
to be disregarded in determining whether the business purposes were
"legitimate.'
,
In not specifically defining what was meant by legitimate business
purposes3 the Court implicitly adopted the tests proposed in these
the scope of the per se doctrine." (Ante, at 500-501). If it is this
sentence which determines the range of issues open on remand there
will be no examination at the trial of the business or economic back-
ground of the credit arrangements here attacked or of the effects, if
any, of this arrangement on competition in the prefabricated house
market.
Id. at 524.
This criticism of the Court's use of the phrase "legitimate business purposes" misap-
prehends the basis for the Court's use of that phrase. Under the holding of the Fortner
case, after a tying arrangement had been established there would be no examination
of whether there were "legitimate business purposes" which would justify the tie.
Rather, the seller's "legitimate business purposes" would be examined first in order
to determine whether the alleged tying agreement did in fact involve the sale of two
separate products. Justice Fortas erroneously believed that the Court intended to
permit evidence of "legitimate business purposes" to justify a tie-in arrangement. In
fact, the Court would only permit such evidence to establish the absence of a tie-in
arrangement. Cf. Supreme Court, supra note 5, at 245 n.39.
The possibility that "legitimate business reasons" may obviate a finding of liabil-
ity for an alleged tie-in scheme was also recognized in the Supreme Court's recent
comment on tie-in arrangements. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110
(1976), Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion notes that a justification for the
alleged tie-in might exist if "the sale of lightbulbs [the tied product] is in any way
crucial to the respondent's successful operatiofi." Id. at 3127-28.
" Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 655 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961).
It is of interest to note that the courts seem to be considerably more willing to
recognize the presence of these "legitimate business reasons" when the defendant had
no economic interest in the "tied" product upon which he allegedly conditioned the
sale of his "tying" product. See Crawford Transport Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 338 F.2d
934 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 954 (1965); Miller Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 149 F. Supp. 790 (D.N.C. 1957), afl'd.; 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958). Cf. Rodrigue
v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 1976-2 Trade Cas. 61,143 (E.D. La. 1976).
1, A failure to disregard any such injury would of course result in the
"justification" of all tie-in arrangements.
" The Fortner Court pointed to the factors which it considered relevant in this
1977l
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lower court decisions in determining the sufficiency of the seller's
motives. These tests have provided an adequate standard for judicial
evaluation of the motives and intentions of individual sellers after the
sales have been consummated. 32.1 They have not, however, proved
sufficient to enable businessmen, when faced with unique factual
situations, to order their economic conduct in conformity with the tie-
in proscriptions of the antitrust laws, nor have they always served to
foster vigorous competition in the marketplace.
Suggestions for Reform
Although it has not been framed in precisely these terms, the
particular case, see note 28 supra, but it did not define the term "legitimate business
purposes". This failure to define the term led to some regrettable confusion. See note
29 supra.
32 .1 See Beefytrail, Inc. v. Beefyking International, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 799 (M.D.
Fla. 1972) (condemning "circumstances where the franchisor, by an intentional course
of conduct, seeks to circumvent the antitrust laws concerning tying arrangements by
requiring a franchisee to purchase a restaurant and its equipment previously estab-
lished"); Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cas., 60, 995 (5th Cir. 1976);
Northern v. McGraw-Edison Co., 1976-2 Trade Cas., 61,091 (8th Cir. 1976).
It should be noted that in examining the motives and intentions of sellers who
allegedly imposed tie-in arrangements upon their customers, the courts have been
unable to arrive at a consistent position with respect to the issue of tied prices as
opposed to tied products. The courts have struggled with the problems raised by the
requirement of separate prices for distinct items of commerce for many years. United
States v. Loews, 571 U.S. 38, 53-55 (1962). Recently, however, a question has arisen
as to how far the courts will go in analyzing a defendant's price structure in order to
determine his "intention" of tying the sale of two distinct products. In Hill v. A-T-O,
Inc., 535 F.2d 1349 (2d Cir. 1976), where a defendant claimed that membership in a
buying service was granted "free" to purchasers of his vacuum cleaner, the court stated
"although defendants contend that membership in the buying service was 'free', used
solely as a 'promotional gimmick' in the sale of vacuum cleaners, we believe this point
irrelevant for purposes of tie-in analysis. To hold to the contrary would permit escape
from the antitrust proscription against illegal tie-ins by the simple device of offering
both products as a unit at a single price, while claiming that one of the two is a 'free
giveaway'." Id. at 1354. In SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1976-2 Trade Cas.,
61,199 (E.D. Pa. 1976), however, the court was unwilling to evaluate the economic
realities of the defendant's pricing policies in order to determine whether a tie-in of
two separate products in fact existed. In SmithKline the court found that while the
defendant's policy of granting discounts in conjunction with the purpose of multiple
separate products constituted "economic armtwisting," it was not tantamount to a tie-
in violation because "from an abstract prospective, if one disregards the economics of
the marketplace, hospital pharmacists had the 'freedom to choose' any of Lilly's prod-
ucts without having to buy a tied product; thus they were 'free to take either product
by itself.' Id. The economics of the marketplace precluded that freedom of choice for
most hospitals; such a freedom of choice, more prevalent in theory than in operational
reality, is enough to circumvent the tie-in prohibitions of the relevant antitrust laws."
"TOTAL PRODUCT" APPROACH
basic thrust of the two-product analysis has been an examination of
the interest, if any, which a seller retains in the tying product after
the tie-in sale has been consummated. If the seller's continued inter-
est in the tying product is substantial and can only be protected
through the mechanism of requiring the purchase of products or
services in addition to the tying product, no illegal tie-in arrangement
will be found.? On the other hand, if the seller's interest does not
meet this test of continuity and substantiality, an illegal tie-in in-
volving two products will be found. The problem with this analysis
is that it examines the arrangement purely from the viewpoint of the
seller and fails to evaluate the position of the purchaser or of the
marketplace at the time that the alleged tie-in sale is consummated.
What is needed is an analysis of the question of whether the two
allegedly separate goods or services do in fact comprise a unique and
definable single entity. The inquiry would then be focused not on
whether the seller had some "legitimate" reason for combining the
products or services at issue in any given case, but rather whether the
final "combined" product is so unique and specialized that it is justi-
fied in being treated as a single product.
3 3 '
Under the present standards, the tying and the tied products are
examined separately to see whether there are distinct markets for
each of themu and whether the relationship between the two
individual products is such that their combination is "justified". 5
Under the proposed standards a court would not look to the markets
and attributes of the individual products, but rather would concen-
trate upon the claimed uniqueness of the total bundle of goods or
services which was the subject of the alleged tie-in sale.
This shift in emphasis would permit a court to evaluate the eco-
nomic desirability of the transaction as it actually occurred rather
3 See United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd, 365 U.S. 567 (1961); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292
F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961).
"-I See Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 1976-2 Trade Cab.,
75,182 (5th Cir. 1976).
'S -ee cases cited note 24 supra.
5 See cases cited note 33 supra.
Some courts have attempted to explain their hesitancy in finding a tie-in violation
when the seller is "justified" in offering what appear to be separate products only in
conjunction with one another by stating that this "justification" defense is based upon
a finding that in such a situation the seller does not exercise "economic coercion" over
the buyer. Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. Harco Products, Inc., 512 F.2d 993, 1002 (9th Cir.
1975). This does not seem to be the case since the economic motives of the seller with
respect to his product cannot possibly have any relationship whatsoever to the eco-
nomic power of the seller with respect to the purchaser.
1977]
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than being forced to hypothesize as to whether there would have been
a market for the individual products had the alleged "tie-in" never
occurred. In addition, this approach would deprive a court of its
ability to base its decision upon such extraneous considerations as the
"legitimacy" of the motives of the seller.
Abandonment of the evaluation of individual product markets
and the motives of particular suppliers would result in a more realis-
tic appraisal 'of the economic realities of the marketplace. While the
leading case in the area has stated that "a manufacturer cannot be
forced to deal in the minimum product that could be sold,"36 this
warning has not actually been heeded. In fact, the courts, in concen-
trating upon the separate components in an alleged tie-in sale have
failed to evaluate whether the combined entity constitutes a single
separate product by virtue of the fact that it is more than the mere
sum of its component parts."
Under this "total product" test, it would be necessary to deter-
mine whether a given consumer would be able to enter the market-
place and assemble the same final product that the "tie-in" seller is
attempting to market by merely finding a complete substitute for the
alleged "tie-in" product. If the consumer could assemble this final
product on his own, without the intercession of this particular seller's
tying product, there would be a finding of an illegal combination of
two separate products. If, on the other hand, the special features or
other uniqueness of the "combined" product prevented the consumer
from accomplishing this, no tie-in of two "separate" products could
be found.3
Conclusion
The doctrine of per se liability in tie-in cases 39 does little to
foster an evaluation of the economic realities involved in allegedly
illegal tie-in agreements. Such rigorous interpretations of the stric-
11 United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. at 559.
3 See Supreme Court, supra note 5, at 244-45; Turner, supra note 5, at 67-72.
Courts have examined whether the components of an alleged tie-in are so interrelated
as to preclude a finding of two separate products. This approach alone, however, does
not avoid the danger of requiring the sale of a "minimum product." In order to avoid
this pitfall it is necessary to evaluate the "combined" product in order to determine
whether it is an economically viable separate entity which a manufacturer has a
legitimate right to exploit.
38 This would permit the jury to determine economic responsibility and result in
the imposition of per se liability only when the marketplace had actually been dam-
aged by the conduct of the seller.
*, Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
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tures of the antitrust laws are economically useful only if a court's
attention is focused upon the realities of the economic transaction
before it.
If a court fails to adopt the "total product" approach in examin-
ing the question of whether two products are involved in alleged tie-
in arrangements, innovative marketing concepts will be sacrificed in
the name of fictitious economic benefits. If a manufacturer is able to
associate and combine his products in such a way as to develop an
economically unique and useful entity, the fact that the component
parts of that entity may be available in segregated units should not
result in an automatic finding of a tie-in violation. Only if the alleg-
edly new and unique product is in fact no more than that which the
consumer himself could assemble should antitrust liability be im-
posed. If a manufacturer has in fact created a distinctly new product
which is uniquely appropriate for any given consumer, he should not
be penalized because he could have marketed this product in some
other manner.
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